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‘Growing Pains’: Key Challenges for New Conditional
Cash Transfer Programmes in Latin America
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes have been
established in more than a dozen Latin American and Caribbean
countries in the past 10 years. As the original models have become
widely disseminated, new programmes have had to confront
unresolved issues. Primary among them are graduation rules or,
as some prefer to call them,  ‘exit-door’ strategies.
Mexico’s Progresa (now Oportunidades) has been the most important
source of inspiration for CCT programmes in the region. It is known
for focusing on the long-term objective of human-capital
accumulation, such as ensuring that children attend school. This
emphasis has led to a very low percentage of ‘graduations’, i.e.,
only 0.11 per cent of beneficiaries, from the programme since
its start in 1997. The justification is that since the programme’s
success depends on breaking the intergenerational transmission
of poverty, beneficiary children should receive continuous support
throughout their educational cycles.
Chile Solidario does not have such a strong focus on human-capital
outcomes. Instead, it concentrates on families in extreme
deprivation and provides, through its Puente component, intensive
psycho-social support for two years, in addition to providing
families with cash transfers.
Many analysts have considered this programme a role model
because this intensive support is regarded as an ‘exit-door’ out
of deprivation, in contrast to the cash transfer, which such
analysts regard as potentially generating dependency. However,
even when families leave the Puente component after two years,
they can still become eligible for other cash transfers from the
broader network of social-protection services, such as the
Subsidio Único Familiar.1
How have such older programmes influenced the more recent CCT
programmes in the region?  Paraguay’s Tekoporâ and El Salvador’s Red
Solidaria
2 are illustrative of the challenges faced by smaller countries
with lower financial and institutional capacities. Like Mexico’s
Oportunidades, both programmes place a strong emphasis on
conditionalities that ensure human-capital accumulation. However,
beneficiary families can stay in the programmes for only three years.
Afterwards, the programme should re-assess their poverty status and
undertake some phasing-out or exit-related measures.
This brief time limit highlights the tensions between the two major
objectives of most CCTs—namely, short-run poverty alleviation
(through transfers) and breaking the intergenerational transmission
of poverty (through health and education conditionalities). Is it
reasonable, for instance, to ‘graduate’ families before the completion
of the educational cycle (or even the immunization cycle) of
beneficiary children?
Paraguay’s family support activities, which are inspired by Chile
Solidario, are designed to enable families to ‘graduate’ from poverty
within a three-year period. But this feature is not consistent with the
programme’s human-capital objectives, which require a much longer
period of coverage.
The shortage of financial and institutional support for the
programme partly explains its short duration. This is also why there
has been a shift from a focus on human-capital outcomes towards
‘complementary activities’ that could boost the productive capacities
of families so that they could overcome poverty within three years.
Moreover, the programme’s hiring of ‘family guides’ to provide the
needed intensive support has implied additional administrative
costs that inhibit broadening the coverage of the programme
among extremely poor households.
In such a context, one of the major challenges for these programmes
is to secure enough political support to guarantee their continuance
beyond their first three-year cycle. In Colombia’s Familias en Acción,
for example, the initial three-year limit was effectively jettisoned
as the longer-term demands of its human-capital objective grew
stronger over time.
It remains to be seen whether the three-year limit will be strictly
enforced in Paraguay and El Salvador. If their programmes do
gain broader political support, they could evolve, hopefully, into
permanent features of each country’s social protection strategy.
This could enable them to access larger budgets and achieve
wider coverage. If not, they would remain, unfortunately, one-off
experiments that could benefit some extremely poor families for at
least a short period of time. But they would achieve only a negligible
longer-term impact on extreme poverty.
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